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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
\ 
vs. I Case No 
10793 
KLAUS D. GURGEL, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
D. WAYNE NICHOL, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
This action was commenced by the Plaintiff on July 5, 
1 !:JG(i. in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County against 
the Defendant for conversion and trespass. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant was the owner of a certain residential 
property located at 2!)12 East 4800 South. Salt Lake County 
State of Utah, which was mortgaged to the Trac~· Collin, 
Savings and Trust Company. On the 7th day of De<'ember. 
1964, Tracy Collins Saving,; and Trust Company loo~ 
judgment against the Defendant in the Third District Court 
for Salt Lake County, Civil No. 14979:2 and on the :26th da.1 
of January, 196!), said propC'rty was sold at Sheriff's Sale to 
one D. L. Holt (record page l 9). On the 7th day of Augu~t. 
1965. the Defendant vacated the premi;.;es (re<'orded page 11. 
Answer No. 6) and on the :2:)th day of April, 1966, D.L. Holt 
and his wife and the Plaintiff and his wife entered rnlo a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract for the sale- and purchase or 
the aforedescribed property (n'cord pages l:J & 16). Plain-
tiff took posse::;sion of the property on that date. On the bth 
day of May, 1966, the Defendant, without permission of lhe 
Plaintiff and without prior demand entered the premises of 
the Plaintiff while he and hi::; famil.v wNe away and removed 
the items described in Paragraph :2 of Plaintiff's Complaint 
(record page 11. Answt>r 8 & 9). 
After demanding the return of the property removed by 
the Defendant from the premise::; and Defendant's failure• to 
do so, this action was commenced. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment upon 
the grounds that the pleadings, Answers to Interrogatorie,:. 
Affidavit, and Exhibits show that Defendant had transferrt>d 
all right, title, and interest in the property in que:-;tion at lhe 
Sheriff's Sale or abandoned :-;ame>, and that the Plaintiff had 
acquired the right to the immediatP and :-;olP po:-;:-;es:-;ion ol 
~aid prorwrty on the 2Gth day of April, 1966, and therefore 
tlwrP was no genuine i::isue as to any material fact between 
the parti<:>." and Plaintiff was entitled to a judgment against 
tht> Defendant for the value of the property converted by the 
Drfendant and such puniti\·e damages as may be reasonable 
, I and judgment dismissing Defendant's counterelaim (records 
pages 17 & 18). Said Motion was granted and the Plaintiff 
awarded judgment again:;;t the Defendant for $1500.00 and 
$1.00 punitive damages and dismissing Defendant's counter-




THE DEFENDANT EITHER TRANSFERRED ALL 
INTEREST HE HAD IN THE PROPERTY OR ABANDONED 
IT AND THE PLAINTIFF HAD ACQUIRED THE RIGHT TO 
ITS POSSESSION WHEN REMO\'ED BY THE DEFENDANT 
O'.'l ~IAY 8, 1966. 
The propert~· in\'Ol\'ed in this dispute consists of fi\'e 
di\!ng boards, Lhree swimming pool heating units, one 
'i\\ imming pool ladder, one swimming pool heater, one 
"wimming pool lighting fixture, and one work table. The 
property conve~·<:>d by the Sheriff's Deed on January 26, 1965, 
consists of the real property, a residenl'e, a garage, a bath-
hou.-;e, and a swimming pool. The aforementioned items, 
rxcept for the work table, e\'en though not attached to the 
s11imming pool itself on May 8, 1966, the date of Defendant's 
con\'ersion, could ha\·e been so attached and used by the 
Plaintiff in conrwction with the u:se of the swimming pool 
un the premises. 
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The last paragraph of the Sheriff's Deed aft0r lhc· 
legal description of the property states: 
"Togeth0r with all and singular the tenements, hP-
rcditaments, an appurtenances thereunto belonging or 
in anywise appertaining, to ha\e and to hold the samp 
unto said party of the second part, its successor.sand 
assigns forever." 
Black's Law Dictionary. Fourth Edition, 19:)7, at PagP 
16:37 defines "tenement" as follows: 
"Thi:-; term. in its vulgar acceptation, is only applil'd 
to how.;e:-; and other buildings, but in its original. 
pro1wr. and legal sPn:-;e it signifies everything thal 
mayb0 holden. prO\ided it be of a permanwnt nature. 
whethPr it be of a :-;uhstantial and sensible or of an 
unsub:-;tantial. ideal. kind." 
The term "hereditaments" is defined in Black':-; La11 
Dictionary. Fourth Edition, 19G7, at Page 8G9 as: 
"Things capable of being inherited, he it corporeal or 
or incorporeal, real. personal, or mixed, and including 
not onl~· lands and ever~·thing thereon. but also heir-
looms, and certain furniture which, by custom. ma) 
descent to the heir together with the land." 
In Moore vs. Sharpe, 91 Ark .+07, 1:21 S.W. 3-tl, at Page 
344. it was stated: 
"The term 'hereditaments' includes anything that ma) 
be inherited, be it corporeal or incorporeal. real . 
personal. or mixed. The word i::o almo:-;t as comprc>-
hensive as 'property'." 
Black's Law Dictionary. Fourth Edition, 19f57. define' 
"appurtenance" at page l:);) Ds follo1\s: 
"That which belongs to "omething else; an adjunct; an 
appendate; sonwthing annexed to another thing more 
worthy as principal, and which passes as incident to 
it, as a right of way or other easement to land; an out-
house, barn, garden. or orchard, to a house or messuagc. 
(case cited) An article adapted lo the use ofthe property 
to which it is connected, and which was intented to be 
a permament accession to the freehold." 
An article may bocome an "appurtenance" to realty 
without physical attachment. Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Company vs. Jensen, 69 S.D. 225, 9 N.W. 2d 140, 141 
The Defendant states that the Sheriff's Deed conveyed 
only the real property and no personal property was included 
in this transaction. If this were true, the aforementioned 
term:-; which were included in the deed are mere surplusage 
and meaningless. Almost all real property transactions, 
especially those involving private residence, necessarily 
inclucle the transfer of ownership of personal property which 
is related to th0 use and enjoyment of the fee. It is not un-
reasonable to conclude that swimming pool equipment is 
related to the use and Pnjoyment of real property which 
rnntains a swimming pool even though the equipment is not 
actual!~· physically attached to the real property or pool. 
Defendant's ownership of the real property ceased on 
January 26, 196fi, when the Sheriff's Deed conveyed owner-
,;hip to D.L. Holt. On August 7, 1965, seven and one-half 
months after the ShNiff's Sale. the Defendant vacated the 
prPmi:-;es and took with him all of his personal effects. He 
ldt lwhind the items I isted in Plaintiff's Complaint and some 
of tlw item:-; listPd in his counterclaim. On May 8, 1966, he 
11ent to the Plaintiff\; residence and without notice or 
de111and tre,.,1rn:-;sNI on th0 property and removed the items 
listed in Plaintifl"s Complaint. Thi:-; act took plal'l' 10 month.' 
after the Sheriff's Sale and ovt>r n i n P month:-; after th,, 
Defendant had vacated the premise:-;. 
In the case of Duckett v;-;. Horne Building and Loan 
Association, 10 Pa. D. & C. 2d 181. (19G7) the Plaintiff, 
purchased a home and aftpr one year defaulted on the mort 
gage payments. The defendant brought !(~gal action and for\·· 
closed on the property and it was sold at Sheriff's ~air to 
the Veterans Administration. The Veterans Administration 
notified the owner to vacate the premises whi<'h they did. 
leaving on the premises the storm window:-;, c;creens. and 
venetian blinds. The Veteran,,; :\drnini:-;tration then sold th\• 
the property to another party. Plaintiff brought thi:-; action to 
recover the value of these items. 
The Court held that the storm windows and screen:-; \1erp 
fixtures and as such passed with the rPalty. Ho1H'1er. the) 
held in regard to the venetian blinds a:-; follow:-;: 
"The venetian blind:-; purcha:-;ed by t.he Plaintiffs ma) 
be said to fall within the cla:-;s of l'hattPl:-i. 11hich. in 
the case of Clayton vs. Lienhard. C\12 Pa. 4.:33. arP 
described as 'those which are manifest!~ furnitun-'. ac 
distinguished from improvemonts, and not particular 
fitted to the property with which tlw~ are uc;ed.' ThP'I' 
chattels are heldtoalwaysrernainpersonalty. Hm1e1er. 
where the ownl'fs of chattels 1oluntarily relinqui,;h 
control thereof and leave th<>rn on the premi,,;es after 
due notice to vacate, knowing that the property ha,; 
been sold to another, they must bt> considered to hall' 
abandoned these chattel~. See 1 Arn Jur 2d§:3 on A-
bandonment." 
It has been held that mere nonuse of propPrty and lap~e 
of time without claiming ownership is insufficient to proll' 
abandonment. However, such facts are cornpPtent P1idt>nl'l' 
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of an intent to abandon and are entitled to great weight when 
considered with the other circumstances. 1 Am Jur 2d, §41, 
\bandonment, Pages ;33 & 34. In the case at hand there are 
nunwrou:-; circumstances present to show conclusively that 
thP Defendant intended to abandon the swimming pool equip-
a:0 11·011 as the other items involved herein. First, the Defen-
dant had knowledge of the Sheriff':-; Sale in January of 1965 
and wal' awar0 that the new owner would request him to move. 
Se(·ond. the DPfendant vacated the premises in Augu.'."t of 
19();), and took with him his personal effects and those 
chattel:-; he d0sired leaving behind all other:-;. Third, 
tlw D0f0ndant knew that the property had been resold 
to thP Plaintiff and that the Plaintiff had moved rn on 
\pril ~5. 1966. Fourth, the Defendant made no claim to 
m1 ner:-;hip of the property until the date he trespassed to 
m1101e it. Fifth, the DPfendant did not make claim to 
mrner:-;hip of the propPrty listPd in his counterclaim until 
.\ugu:-;t 7, 1966, one month after this action was commenced. 
The Defendant :-;tates that even if he has abandoned 
lh0 pro1wrty the title to said property would not vest in the 
Plaintiff. By the very definition of abandonment, the owner 
r0linquishe:-; his right, title, claim, and possession to any 
1wr:-;on who reduces it to possession. When the Defendant 
11 alked away from the property and left the swimming pool 
Pquipment, work bench, and other items behind. his inten-
tion was to 0ither abandon it to the next owner or to make 
a :-;ale of the property to ~Ir. Holt, the Plaintiff's prede-
<·e:-;sor in int<>re:-;t. The chain of title is without inter-
ruption either wa~·. ThP only other logical conclusion is 
that he intended to make a gift of the property to Mr. Holt. 
The Defendant's position as to the damages awarded 
to 1hP Plaintiff i:-; correct. Since the value of the property 
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C'onverted by the defendant has not been e:-;taLlished in 
record and the value alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint wa, 
denied by the Defendant, the Trial Court should have onh 
granted Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as to 
liability and set the matter for trial on the issue of damage, 
As to the Trial Court's award of $1.00 punitive dama-
ges, there is ample evidence in the record to show a wilful! 
trespass on Plaintiff's property to support an award of ~ucli 
a nominal amount. Plaintiff's Interrogatory No. 8 atSks the 
following question: 
"8. Did the Defendant ask and receive permission 
from the Plaintiff or his authorized agent to enter 
the premises located at 2512 East 4800 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, on or about the 8th day of May. 
1966?" (record Page 8) 
The Defendant's sworn answer was: 
"8. The Defendant went to the door and no one was 
at home." (record page 11) 
CONCLUSION 
There is ample evidence contained in this record to 
support the Trial Court's finding that there was no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the Plaintiff wa; 
entitled a Judgment as a matter of law against the Dden 
dant on the issue of liability. 
The Trial Court'::; award to the Plaintiff of the alleged 
\a]ue of the property without proof as to it's value was in 
error. 
The award of punitive damages of $1.00 for trespass 
upon Plaintiff's property is supported by the record. 
The Trial Court's ruling on liability should be affirmed 
and the matter referred back to the District Court for a 
determination as to damages. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DA YID E. YOCOM 
Attorney for Plaintiff & Respondent 
KARRAS, VAN SC IVER & YOCOM 
661 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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